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Abstract 
This article examines the formation of European identity among children in two 
very different countries – the traditionally Eurosceptic Britain and the enthusiastic 
EU newcomer, Bulgaria. The paper revisits existing debates about the 
relationships between European identity, knowledge, and the political and 
historical context, paying particular attention to the meanings attached to Europe. 
It demonstrates that children who identify as European are more likely to see 
Europe in geographic terms, which facilitates the perception of the European 
identity as ‘default’. In contrast, children who refuse to describe themselves as 
European see Europe as an exclusive political entity, associated with high 
standards and distant elites. These perceptions are significantly more common 
among Bulgarian children, who often depict Europe as a dream, and perceive the 
European identity as an ideal they aspire to reach. The article also shows how 
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ethnicity and the images of Europe influence the relationship between national 
and European identities.  
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has expanded at an unprecedented pace from 12 member-
states in 1994 to 27 in 2007. One of the main challenges enlargement has posed is the 
ever-increasing gap between the elites and the citizens or the so-called democratic or 
legitimacy deficit (Grundmann, 1999; Lord, 1998: 165). Recent events such as the 
painful negotiations over the latest EU treaty and the failed referenda in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005 suggest that, without a proper level of support from the people, the 
future of the European project becomes uncertain. It is therefore hardly a surprise that 
the past decades have seen a surge in empirical studies on popular support for EU 
integration, which examined the impact of factors ranging from values and national 
attachments to the perceived economic benefits of European integration (e.g. Deflem 
and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1977; Janssen, 1991). As 
the EU expanded to include the former communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, attention shifted to the new member-states. These provided an ideal laboratory 
for existing explanatory models, and for their elaboration (Christin, 2005; Cichowski, 
2000; Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008).  
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While this body of research approaches European integration primarily as an 
economic and political process, literature published since the mid-1990s increasingly 
focuses on the social and cultural dimensions of Europeanization, including the 
formation of European identity (e.g. Breakwell and Lyons, 1996; Bruter, 2005; 
Cinnirella, 1996; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001; Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; 
2008). Several scholars (Bache and George, 2006; Beus, 2001; Decker, 2002) have also 
suggested that support for European integration, and hence the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU, is dependent on the development of a stronger collective attachment to Europe. 
Our article contributes to this body of work by examining the formation of European 
identity among children in Bulgaria and England. More specifically, our aim is twofold. 
First, we seek to clarify the relationships between European identification, knowledge 
(cognitive mobilization) and the political and historical context, paying particular 
attention to the meanings children attach to Europe. We argue that greater levels of 
cognitive mobilization or knowledge about Europe do not automatically imply stronger 
attachments to Europe. Rather, levels of identification with Europe depend on the 
meanings attached to Europe. These meanings, in turn, are shaped in part by the 
historical and political context. Second, we also investigate the relationship between 
European and national identity, focusing on the role of representations of Europe vis-à-
vis the nation, as well as on links with ethnicity.  
To achieve these aims, we draw on 174 semi-structured interviews with children 
aged 9–10, conducted in two different member-states: Bulgaria and the UK, more 
precisely one of its four nations – England. Given Bulgaria’s enthusiastic embrace of 
European membership and England’s notorious Euroscepticism, one would expect to 
 4
find higher levels of identification with Europe among Bulgarian children. Yet as our 
results demonstrate, this expectation is misleading: European identifications are actually 
considerably more common among English than Bulgarian children, despite the fact that 
Bulgarian children tend to be more knowledgeable about Europe and, in particular, the 
EU. These results lead us to revisit existing explanatory models of European 
identification along the lines outlined above.  
The decision to conduct our study among children may seem unusual. Existing 
research on European identity focuses largely on adults (notable exceptions are Barrett, 
2007 and Philippou, 2005), and one may also wonder whether children as young as 9 or 
10 years old can really form a meaningful attachment to an abstract entity such as 
Europe. Yet existing studies by Barrett and his associates (for a summary see Barrett, 
2007) have clearly demonstrated that by the age of 9 or 10 (and quite often much earlier) 
children already possess a national identity and many – 70% of the 10-year-olds in 
Barrett’s (1996: 357–358) English sample – say they feel European as well. Barrett 
(1996: 363) also found ‘a fundamental shift in children’s awareness of the supranational 
group to which they belonged between six and ten years of age’ since only 3 percent of 
the 6-year-olds in his sample defined themselves as European. Our study thus provides 
an insight into a decisive stage of European identity formation. This is not to say that the 
forms of European identification detected among children, and the factors determining 
them, will be immediately applicable to adults. European and national identities, along 
with similarly abstract forms of identification like ethnicity and kinship, tend to be more 
flexible and open to negotiation than for instance gender identities (cf. Jenkins, 2004: 
62–65), and are thus more likely to change as children grow up. Nonetheless, it is 
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feasible to assume that these early forms of European identification, established during 
childhood, will be less flexible than those acquired later in life, and will thus exert a 
lasting impact. If we are to fully understand the key determinants that shape the 
formation of European identity on a mass level, research on children is therefore clearly 
indispensable. 
Explaining European identity 
Paradoxically, even though many studies of European identity are similar both 
theoretically – a majority draw on Tajfel’s (1981) social identity and Turner et al.’s 
(1987) self-categorization theories (among others, Barrett, 1996; Breakwell and Lyons, 
1996; Castano, 2004; Cinnirella, 1996) – and empirically – they tend to analyze the 
same Eurobarometer surveys – the conclusions they reach regarding the existence of 
European identity are often contradictory. Thus, some (Beetham and Lord, 1998: 29) 
argue that ‘most commentators are agreed that a sense of European identity and loyalty 
is embryonic at best among the European electorate’, while others (Bruter, 2005: 131) 
firmly believe that ‘there is such thing as a European identity, which is certainly 
developed by a significant part of the European polity’. These disagreements stem not 
only from the different time periods in which research was conducted but also in part 
from the lack of agreement over the definition and measurement of European identity, in 
particular from the tendency to think of identity as a stable psychological entity or state, 
which, once developed, simply continues to exist. Yet as sociological and 
anthropological theories of identity emphasize, identity is not a fixed ‘thing’ that 
individuals or groups possess, but a discursively and socially constituted process or 
position (e.g. Jenkins, 2004; Lawler, 2008). In line with this, European identity should 
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not be conceptualized as a finished object or state, but as a fluctuating process 
dependent on diverse contextual factors (for a similar approach see Duchesne and 
Frognier, 2008). Identity is best operationalized, therefore, as a ‘series of identifications’ 
(Woodward, 2002: 5).  
 Empirical studies have examined a number of contextual factors that affect the 
process of European identification on a mass level. Inglehart’s early research (1970; 
1977) emphasized the importance of ‘cognitive mobilization’ and value orientations. 
Drawing on theories of modernization developed during the 1950s and the 1960s (e.g. 
Deutsch, 1961), Inglehart suggested that identifications with Europe, as well as support 
for European integration, is likely to be higher among those individuals who are more 
‘cognitively mobilized’ – that is, who are able to relate to remote roles and situations, 
including a remote political community – and among individuals sharing 
‘postmaterialist’ values, such as orientation to individual self-actualization, 
independence and intellectual fulfilment. Subsequent studies confirmed that the link 
between cognitive mobilization and European identification appears relatively robust, 
while the link with postmaterialist values does not (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001; 
Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Janssen, 1991).  
Arguably, the operational definition of cognitive mobilization proposed by 
Inglehart and used in subsequent research is too narrowly focused on formal and 
political dimensions, and hence not entirely adequate if we want to capture the social 
and cultural aspects of European identity formation. When devising his analytical 
framework, Inglehart (1970: 47) limited the original concept of social mobilization 
(Deutsch, 1961) to ‘the individual’s capacity to receive and interpret messages relating 
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to a remote political community’ and measured it using indicators such as exposure to 
the news media, level of education, and frequency of political discussions with friends. 
While not irrelevant, such indicators tell us little about the individual’s ability to 
understand issues related to Europe, and restrict cognitive mobilization to the political 
domain – neither of which is particularly conducive to an inquiry into the social and 
cultural aspects of European identification. To make the argument about cognitive 
mobilization more directly relevant to the study of European identity, it is therefore 
advisable to devise a measurement more open to the diverse dimensions of individual 
knowledge about and understanding of Europe, which does not limit cognitive 
mobilization solely to political communication skills. This is what our study seeks to 
achieve.    
It is tempting to assume that a high level of knowledge about Europe – or, more 
broadly, a high level of cognitive mobilization – will go hand-in-hand with a strong 
attachment to Europe. Yet as Eder (2009: 432–434) points out, the assumption that 
knowledge about Europe and familiarity with European symbols such as the flag or the 
hymn automatically imply the existence of European identification is misleading 
because it overlooks the impact of shared narratives and meanings. Whether or not 
higher levels of knowledge will give rise to European identifications depends on the 
‘content’ of this knowledge – or, more specifically, on the nature of meanings attached 
to Europe.  
Eder is not alone in emphasizing the importance of meanings in shaping 
identifications. Drawing on Turner’s (1975) and Tajfel’s (1981) social identity theory, 
Díez Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) argue that individuals who perceive Europe in 
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positive rather than negative terms will be more likely to identify as European. 
However, it is questionable whether positive images of Europe automatically lead to 
European identification. While social identity theory indeed maintains that individuals 
strive to attain a positive social identity, this does not necessarily mean they will 
immediately identify with the group they perceive in positive terms, or attempt to 
emulate its behaviour (‘social mobility’). In endeavouring to attain a positive identity, 
they could also choose to enter into a competitive relationship with the higher-status 
group (‘social competition’), or seek to improve one’s own group status and image by 
changing the criteria for comparison with the higher-status group (‘social creativity’). 
Furthermore, even when an individual chooses the route of social mobility, it is possible 
to envisage a situation where the positive identity is constructed as an ideal one should 
strive to attain, but has not yet achieved – which could potentially discourage the 
immediate adoption of the higher-status identity.  
These diverse strategies of identity management suggest that the relationship 
between European identification and meanings cannot be understood fully if we restrict 
our analysis to the simple opposition between negative and positive meanings. One 
solution might lie in adopting a more encompassing typology of meanings of Europe, 
and distinguishing between ‘civic’ and ‘cultural’ components of European identity 
(Bruter, 2005). Although widely used in studies of national identity, such typologies are 
often criticized for being too crude to capture the variety of actual forms of collective 
identification and exclusion (Janmaat, 2006; Pehrson et al., 2009). In particular, when 
dealing with sample sizes that are amenable to qualitative analysis – which is the case in 
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our study – it is better to avoid starting with a rigidly defined typology of meanings, and 
instead devise a more nuanced one based on bottom-up analysis of materials.  
Meanings, knowledge and identities are of course not formed in a vacuum, but 
are shaped by the particularities of the political, social and historical context. As Díez 
Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) show in their examination of European identity 
formation in Spain, the historical trajectory and political developments after the death of 
Franco gave rise to a positive portrayal of Europe, which became associated with 
various economic and political gains, as well as with strength, modernization, 
democratization and peace. These positive meanings, argue the authors, are among the 
factors that can explain the relatively high levels of European identification among 
Spanish citizens. Moreover, as Faas (2010: 12) points out, ‘the experience of people in 
different countries demonstrates that there can be no single definition of Europe.’ It is 
feasible to expect that the historical and political trajectories of Bulgaria and England 
will also have an impact on the meanings of Europe invoked by children, and thereby 
also on their identifications.  
 Even if, in many aspects, England is a fairly typical representative of Western 
Europe, this is hardly the case in terms of its positioning vis-à-vis Europe. Situated 
geographically off the mainland of Europe, the UK is often perceived as detached from 
Europe; at the level of everyday discourse, the inhabitants of the British isles frequently 
draw contrasts between the British ‘us’ and ‘them’ in continental Europe, and even 
associate travelling to other European countries as ‘going to Europe’. Historically, the 
UK was a far less enthusiastic supporter of European integration than, for instance, 
France and Germany, and its political elites were often openly hostile or at best sceptical 
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toward EU policies. The Eurobarometer surveys indicate that such attitudes are shared 
by a considerable proportion of the population; British citizens are typically among the 
least enthusiastic supporters of the EU, and also exhibit lowest levels of attachment to 
Europe (Cinnirella and Hamilton, 2007). Furthermore, of all four nations in the UK, the 
English are often given as an example of being the least ‘supportive of the EU’ (Carey, 
2002). It is therefore not a surprise that the UK is often labelled as the ‘awkward 
partner’ (Blair et al., 2001) in a ‘troubled relationship’ with Europe (Minford et al., 
2005: 20). Some authors even suggest that Britain is a ‘stranger in Europe’ (Wall, 2008: 
204–221) and Europe is, at best, its friendly ‘other’ (Risse, 2004: 266).  
At first sight, England’s political and historical trajectory may lead us to expect 
that English children will perceive Europe as a distant entity, and refuse to identify with 
it, or at least that levels of European identification among them will be lower than 
among Bulgarian children. Yet, a closer look at the historical and political context of 
European identity formation in Bulgaria indicates that this may not be the case. One of 
the main differences between Eastern and Western European conceptions is in the 
definition of what the ‘ideal’ Europe is and who (which countries) represents it (Kuus, 
2007; Mihelj, 2005; Ranova, 2010). Kuus (2007: 22) claims that when the concept 
‘Eastern Europe’ was coined, it was defined ‘as being a part of Europe by geography but 
still in process of becoming fully European in the political and cultural sense’ and ‘the 
region’s difference from Western Europe became conceptualized as distance from an 
idealized Europe’. Originally formed during the Enlightenment period (Wolff, 1994), 
these perceptions, along with the associated feelings of inferiority vis-à-vis the West, 
were revived after the fall of the communist regimes. In this context, Central and 
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Eastern Europeans often view EU membership as a ‘return to Europe’ (Katsikas and 
Siani-Daview, 2010: 15; Kuus, 2007: 27).  
In the Bulgarian case, Ranova (2010: 155–172) says, this return is linked with an 
ideological battle between the ‘cultural establishment’ and the ‘elite-in-the-making’. For 
the former, Bulgaria’s national identity should be enhanced rather than demarcated by 
Europeanization, whereas the latter ‘creates its recognizable identity by enunciating a 
direct critique of nationalism’ (Ranova, 2010: 156). Both groups have one thing in 
common – ‘an inferiority complex’ towards Europe. They feel they are lagging behind 
the Europe they are aiming towards. It will be interesting to see whether this inferiority 
complex is shared by Bulgarian children. If this is the case, then it may well be that the 
difference between the level of European identifications among Bulgarian and English 
children will not be particularly striking. After all, regardless of its troubled relationship 
with Europe and in particular the EU, the UK is a long-standing member. It is quite 
possible that at least for the youngest generations of Britons, European identity – much 
like British, English or Scottish identity – is increasingly becoming something they take 
for granted. If it is the case that in established Western nation-states, national identity 
tends to become ‘banal’ and self-evident (cf. Billig, 1995), then it is reasonable to 
expect that in old EU member-states, European identity will also, gradually, become 
‘banal’ (cf. Cram, 2009). Existing comparative data on European identity in old 
member-states yield some support to this argument. Citizens of the founding states are 
more likely to identify as European than those of the UK and Scandinavian states (Citrin 
and Sides, 2004: 167). Also, longitudinal comparisons reveal that the proportion of 
citizens expressing equal attachment to both their own nation and Europe is growing 
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across all old member-states, including the UK (Citrin and Sides, 2004: 170). These 
results lead us to tread carefully when hypothesizing about the relationship between 
European identifications in England and Bulgaria. If our reasoning is correct, the level 
of European identifications in Bulgaria should be similar to that in England, or perhaps 
even slightly lower.   
Another issue to consider when developing an explanatory model for European 
identity is the relationship between European and national identifications. Some 
commentators suggest that European and national identities are ‘mutually incompatible’ 
(Cinnirella, 1996: 258), and that the ‘unfinished’ formation of the European identity 
might represent a potential threat to current identities (Breakwell, 2004: 34-35). 
Comparative studies involving several member-states, however, typically demonstrate 
that the nature of the relationship varies from country to country (e.g. Citrin and Sides, 
2004; Duchesne and Frognier, 1995) and also with time (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008). 
Often, people who identify strongly with nation(-state)s also identify strongly with 
Europe and hence, the two identities are complementary – or, as Díez Medrano and 
Gutiérrez (2001) and Risse (2004) suggest, ‘nested’. This nestedness resembles the 
‘Russian Matruska doll’ where ‘national identities form the core and European identity 
the outer boundary of the Russian doll’ (Risse, 2004: 250). Finally, studies imply that in 
some cases, national and European identities are not related at all (e.g. Mihić, 2009).  
Given the variability of the relationship between national and European identities 
across time and space, it makes sense to ask what factors might help explain this 
variation. According to Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001), a key factor is the framing 
of Europe and its relationship to national identity. If Europe is seen as a threat to 
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national identity, then strong national attachments are likely to go hand-in-hand with 
low levels of European identification. If, in contrast, Europe is seen as potentially 
advantageous for the nation, then the relationship is likely to be positive. Díez Medrano 
and Gutiérrez also argue that these different meanings are shaped by the disparate 
political contexts and historical trajectories of individual countries, which helps explain 
why the nature of the relationship between national and European identities varies from 
country to country. Another decisive factor, which accounts for the variation of the 
relationship across time, is the existence of political contestation; if the benefits of 
European integration are disputed, anti-European arguments are likely to prompt an 
increase in the proportion of citizens who perceive Europe as a threat to national 
identity, which in turn leads to a negative relationship between national and European 
identifications (cf. Duchesne and Frognier, 2008). Finally, Cinnirella and Hamilton’s 
(2007) study among British Asians suggests that the relationship between national and 
European identities may also depend on ethnicity. In examining our materials we should 
seek to establish whether and to what extent these arguments apply also to Bulgarian 
and English children’s identifications.  
Methodology and sampling 
Unlike the majority of existing research on European identity, the study relies on in-
depth, semi-structured interviews rather than existing large-scale surveys. Each child 
was interviewed individually for a period of between 40 minutes and an hour and a half. 
The interviews combined closed- and open-ended questions as well as psychological 
strategies, mostly the use of cards and photographs. To assess children’s cognitive 
mobilization vis-à-vis Europe and the EU – that is, their knowledge of Europe/the EU – 
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children were asked to explain what Europe and EU are, to name the member-states, and 
to identify a range of key EU symbols such as the flag and the euro, as well as important 
personalities in the history and present affairs of the Union. Initially, we used more than 
30 photographs when asking children to identify national, local and European symbols 
and personalities. Then, all people’s names were read out. This range of questions 
allowed us to assess cognitive mobilization in a more direct and encompassing way than 
past studies of European identity did. Responses to open-ended questions were coded 
thematically using the constant comparison method (Dye et al., 2000; Glaser, 1965), 
based on relevant differences and similarities in the available material. Children’s 
identifications, on the other hand, were researched by using a number of questions, 
mainly adapted from Barrett’s (2007) studies. First, they were shown cards with identity 
labels (girl, boy, child, pupil, European, British, etc) and were asked to choose and then 
rank the ones that describe them. Then, they were directly asked ‘Are you 
European/Bulgarian/English/British?’ and were subsequently prompted to explain how 
important these identities were for them and what they meant, namely what it means to 
be European/Bulgarian/English/British. Finally, the pupils had to choose among 
different cards that offered different variations of the relationship between their national 
and European identifications. Since the larger study was concerned not only with 
children’s knowledge and identifications but also with a myriad of other factors, the 
questionnaire used included quite a few other questions – on demographics, media use, 
etc. These do not have a direct bearing on the aims of this paper and will be discussed 
elsewhere.1 
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The sample included 174 children between the ages of 9 and 10, of which 67 
were from England and 107 from Bulgaria. All interviews were conducted between 
February 2009 and February 2010. Pupils were recruited through schools, and 
recruitment was guided by a combination of theoretical sampling and disproportionate 
stratified sampling. The chosen methods of data collection and analysis precluded the 
adoption of fully random and proportionate sampling. Instead, drawing on the principles 
of theoretical sampling (cf. Deacon et al., 2007: 54), we sought to recruit children who 
were more likely to help elaborate emerging hypotheses. For instance, given that one of 
the explanatory factors considered in the study was ethnicity, the sample was ethnically 
boosted to ensure an adequate number of ethnic minority children (32.7 percent in 
Bulgaria and 35.8 percent in the UK). The focus was on the Roma minority in Bulgaria 
and the Asian children with family origins from India in England. These are two of the 
biggest minority groups in both countries. Given the overall qualitative nature of the 
sample, it was not possible to include more minority groups because that would have 
prevented meaningful comparisons. Obviously, the label ‘ethnic minority’ is hardly 
telling given that the two ethnic minorities groups are quite different from each other: 
historically and culturally but also in relation to Europe and potentially to the EU. These 
differences undoubtedly have repercussions on the level of European and even national 
identities. The simplification of variables for clarity of presentation purposes, namely 
labelling both groups as ethnic minorities, is by no means an attempt to blur or ignore 
the differences between them and the importance of these differences for the processes 
studied. Which is why, when relevant, the repercussions of these differences will be 
further addressed in the paper. It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of the 
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immense differences between the two ethnic minority groups, quite a few similarities 
were found among them in relation to European identities.  
Furthermore, when the sample was constructed, every effort was made to 
achieve a degree of randomness in drawing the sub-populations. In other words, the 
theoretical saturation aim was achieved with the help of the principles guiding 
disproportionate stratified sampling – a form of probability sampling in which ‘the 
researcher draws a random sample from each subpopulation’ he or she is interested in 
(Neuman, 2007: 152). The procedure was as follows. First, the head teachers of schools 
whose catchment areas cover different socio-economic characteristics (as determined by 
their Ofsted reports in England) were approached in both countries in order to make sure 
that there is a fair representation of socio-economic groups. Further recruitment was 
based on the same principle: inclusion of as many diverse backgrounds as possible. 
Once a head teacher gave permission, all children in the respective age group were 
asked to participate. The final sample includes participants from a wide range of socio-
economic backgrounds and indeed children’s status appears to impact substantially on 
their European identities – a topic explored in further work on the subject. 
Given the size of the sample, we of course cannot claim that our results provide a 
representative portrayal of European identification in England and Bulgaria. The value 
of this study therefore does not lie in estimating average effects of particular causal 
factors (such as cognitive mobilization, meanings, or the historical and political context) 
on European identifications in populations at large. Instead, the contribution lies in 
accounting for why European identifications among selected groups of children are as 
they are, by means of providing a meaningful explanation of relationships between 
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causal factors. We would hope that this explanation of causality will provide a useful 
reference point for large-scale, quantitative studies.  
Results and discussion 
The European identity is not particularly salient among either Bulgarian or English 
children we interviewed. Less than half of all children – 43 percent – say yes when 
asked ‘Are you European?’ In line with our argument – but perhaps in contrast to 
commonsense expectations – the expressions of European belonging are far more 
common in the traditionally Eurosceptic country than in the newcomer that, by all 
accounts, has embraced its membership wholeheartedly. While only 20.6 percent of 
Bulgarian children choose the word ‘European’ to describe themselves, the proportion 
of English children is 28.4 percent, χ2(1, N=174)=6.25, p=0.001. Similarly, while only 
37.4 percent of Bulgarian children reply yes when asked ‘Are you European?’, the 
proportion among English children is 52.2 percent, χ2(1, N=174)=3.71, p=0.05. 
At first sight, it is tempting to suggest that this result is an outcome of Bulgaria’s 
recent membership and the fact that the knowledge about Europe and the EU has not yet 
trickled down to all of its youngest members, and they are therefore not as ‘cognitively 
mobilized’ as their English peers. Yet, other data imply this is not the case. In both 
countries, the proportion of children who are knowledgeable about Europe and the EU is 
significantly higher than the proportion of those who identify with Europe. Although 
only a third of Bulgarians and half of English children define themselves as European, 
many more actually know what Europe is – 62 percent in Bulgaria and 91 percent in 
England, χ2(1, N=174)=18.02, p<0.001. Other questions suggest that, in many aspects, 
and especially with regard to the EU, Bulgarian children are more knowledgeable than 
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English ones. The EU flag is clearly recognized by considerably more children in 
Bulgaria than in England – 84.1 percent vs. 49.3 percent, χ2(1, N=174)=24.16, p<0.001. 
Bulgarians are also more familiar with their national representatives at European level. 
In England, only three children recognise the name of their Commissioner Catherine 
Ashton, while in Bulgaria, 43.9 percent say they have heard about Meglena Kuneva, 
who was a European commissioner at the time of interviewing, χ2(1, N=174)=30.85, 
p<0.001. Furthermore, more Bulgarian than English children tend to recognize their 
MEPs, and only 13 percent of English children as opposed to 33 percent of Bulgarian 
ones, correctly describe the euro as Europe’s currency, χ2(1, N=174)=6.82, p=0.009. 
Finally, although English children are able to list a greater number of European states, 
only one among them (1.5 percent) as opposed to 10.3 percent of Bulgarians, knows the 
exact number of member-states, χ2(1, N=174)=4.96, p=0.026. 
The analysis of the relationships between familiarity with Europe and the EU on 
the one hand, and European identification on the other, also demonstrates that cognitive 
mobilization vis-à-vis Europe and/or the EU does not necessarily lead to higher levels of 
European identification. In fact, our data suggest that is some cases, identification can 
occur without any significant knowledge. Two patterns stand out cross-nationally, each 
present in close to 40 percent of the sample. One is, of those children who know what 
Europe and/or the EU is, as well as identify as European, and the other one is, of those 
children who also know what Europe and/or the EU is but do not define themselves as 
European. When examining each of the two countries separately, it becomes apparent 
that the first pattern is significantly more common among English, and the second 
among Bulgarian children (Table 1), χ2(3, N=174)=17.82, p<0.001.  
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To explain this difference, we need to take into account the role of meanings. 
The thematic analysis of the open-ended questions shows that English and Bulgarian 
children hold rather different perceptions of Europe. English children provide a 
relatively unified description of Europe as a continent – a word used by 48 percent. A 
further 27 percent depict it as a few countries and for 15 percent it is a country. Thus, a 
boy says, Europe is ‘lots of countries in an area of the world’, while another one quite 
simply defines it as ‘one of the seven continents’. 
Bulgarian accounts are qualitatively different. The word continent is used only 
by a fifth of children and another fifth specifically talk about Europe being equal to the 
EU. The biggest thematic group involves those pupils who volunteer the word ‘state’. It 
is unclear whether by state they actually mean a nation-state or a super/supra-state 
organization such as the EU. Furthermore, even some who use the word ‘continent’ 
include vocabulary more typical for the EU and especially for its pre-accession process. 
For example, a girl says, Europe is ‘a continent, in Europe they accepted Italy, Bulgaria, 
Austria’. A boy says Europe is a ‘created’ continent. ‘Accepted’ and ‘created’ clearly 
clash with the geographical meaning of the word ‘continent’, implying there is more to 
Europe than geography (the EU?). Ultimately, a boy who tries to explain how exactly 
Europe and the EU are linked ends up equating them: ‘I know that Bulgaria is part of 
Europe. Europe is countries that have become one; they have joined the European 
Union.’ 
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These results enable us to make sense of the different patterns of identification 
and knowledge. For children who define Europe as a continent, it is most likely easier to 
identify with it, because they accept that simply by virtue of living on that continent they 
qualify as European. By contrast, for pupils who associate Europe with a political entity, 
identification is not that straightforward, since it probably implies complying with 
certain rules and regulations or living up to certain standards, or suggests a personal 
connection with a rather abstract and distant political entity. Given that English children 
are more inclined to see Europe as a continent than Bulgarians, it is feasible to argue 
that these different meanings shape their sense of European-ness, making English 
children on average more willing to self-identify as European, even if they do not know 
much about the EU. Arguably, the geographic perception of Europe is also more 
amenable to a ‘banal’ European identity – taken for granted and perceived as a part of 
the natural order of things.   
The analysis of the additional question of ‘What does it mean to be European’ 
largely confirms these trends. All in all, the cross-national accounts are quite similar. 
For the majority, it is equivalent to living in Europe although not all realize they actually 
do. However, for a significant proportion of Bulgarian – unlike English children – the 
European identity appears as a high-status, dream-like identity, one they aspire towards 
but have not yet attained. For such children, identifying with Europe is not (yet) an 
option.   
 The analysis of the patterns of relationship between knowledge, identification 
and meanings reveals that differences in meanings allow us to explain, not only the 
differences between the two countries, but also national variations among individual 
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children. The majority of English children who identity as European not only know 
more about both Europe and the EU but also tend to define Europe as a continent (71.4 
percent) and the EU as an organization of European states (57 percent), which have 
gathered together to help each other and work as a parliament or a government. In 
contrast, English ‘non-Europeans’ rarely (15.2 percent) define Europe as a continent, 
and half do not know what the EU is – some even think it is the London Olympics, a 
capital city or another name for Europe. Among Bulgarian ‘Europeans’, the focus on 
Europe as a geographical rather than a political entity is not that strong (34.2 percent), 
though it is still considerably stronger in comparison with the ‘non-Europeans’. The 
‘non-Europeans’ hardly ever say Europe is a continent (7 percent), and instead tend to 
describe Europe as a state (33.8 percent) or hold misconceptions (e.g. a city or a school). 
When asked about the EU, more than half do not know what to say, and among those 
who do provide a description, many exclude themselves from it, because they think the 
EU is for rich people and politicians.  
To sum up, meanings clearly intervene in the relationship between knowledge 
and identification at both individual and national level. In England and Bulgaria alike, 
children who identify as European are more likely to see Europe as a geographical entity 
– a meaning that is more conducive to banal Europeanism – and the proportion of 
children who see Europe in geographic terms is higher in England. In contrast, children 
who do not identify as European either do not know what Europe and/or the EU are, or 
(in the Bulgarian case) associate Europe with an exclusive political entity or a distant 
dream. It is due to this that, in the Bulgarian case, the discrepancy between levels of 
cognitive mobilization and European identification is even higher than in England. 
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These results are consistent with our expectations: the meanings children attach to 
Europe (which are of key importance for their European identifications) are closely 
linked with the national political and historical context, including the potential for 
growth of (banal) European identity.   
The final issue to consider is the relationship between the national and the 
European identities. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between the presence of 
identity as such, and its relative salience. The figures on children’s national identities 
show that national identifications – both British and English – are somewhat more 
common among English children. When asked whether they are 
Bulgarian/English/British, 77.6 percent define themselves as Bulgarian, 85.1 percent as 
English and 80.6 percent as British. At the same time, however, national identity 
appears to be significantly more salient for Bulgarian than English children. When given 
a selection of name cards with labels indicating different types of identities (‘girl’, 
‘boy’, ‘pupil’, ‘European’, ‘Bulgarian’, ‘English’, etc) and then asked to rank their 
chosen identities, 70.6 percent rank being Bulgarian among their top three identities as 
opposed to only 40.9 percent and 16.7 percent of English children on British-ness and 
English-ness, respectively (χ2(1, N=174)=16.02, p<0.01 for difference between ranking 
of Bulgarian and English identity and χ2(1, N=174)=38.84, p<0.001 for difference 
between ranking of Bulgarian and British identity). Data on European identity reveal a 
remarkably similar pattern. As already mentioned, the European identity is somewhat 
more common among English than Bulgarian children (52.2 as opposed to 37.4 
percent). Yet at the same time, as many as 40.9 percent of Bulgarian children who 
identify as European by selecting the European card consider it a top three identity, as 
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opposed to only 15.8 percent of English children. The difference is not statistically 
significant, however, perhaps due to the fact that a very small number of children in 
relative figures actually select the European card (22 in Bulgaria and 19 in England). 
These results suggest that by and large, in both countries, national and European 
identities are compatible, if not mutually reinforcing. This is confirmed by the high 
proportion of children who choose to identify both with the nation and with Europe. 
Children were with a set of questions offering them to select the option of identifying 
themselves as only European, only national, or both national and European. In the UK 
case children first got to select between ‘British’, ‘both British and European’ and 
‘European’ and then between ‘English’, ‘both English and European’ and ‘European’. 
As many as 52.3 percent of Bulgarian children choose the ‘Bulgarian and European’ 
option, while among English children, 56.7 percent choose the ‘English and European’ 
option and 62.7 percent the ‘British and European’ option. Quite interestingly, as many 
as 91 percent of those who choose the ‘English and European’ option also choose the 
‘British and European option’ and similarly, as many as 98.3 percent of those who select 
the ‘British and European’ option also select the ‘English and European’ one. Thus, 
even some of the children who initially do not define themselves as European choose a 
combination of national and European identities to describe who they are.  
On the whole, given the relatively similar figures in both countries, it is difficult 
to derive any firm conclusions about the impact of systemic factors – either the political 
and historical context, or the particular meanings shaped by them. If anything, we can 
speculate that the disparate political and historical contexts, as well as meanings of 
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Europe, are both conducive to a predominantly compatible relationship between national 
and European identities.       
The analysis of the factors that shape the relationship between national and 
European identities at individual level is more revealing, especially when combined with 
the qualitative analysis of children’s responses to the question of what it means to be 
European (Table 2). 
  
The first major category includes children who choose a combination of national 
and European identities. For instance, one girl says she is happy to be European because 
‘it is my home and it’s also the place where I like to go on holiday.’ Among children in 
this group, a significant proportion (18 percent in England and 20.5 percent in Bulgaria) 
describe their identities in a way consistent with the notion of nested identities. These 
children explicitly explain they define themselves as European exactly because their 
country is part of Europe and/or the EU, as the two girls in the quotations below do: 
  
— Why did you say you are European? 
— Because I was from Britain. 
 
— Who do you think is European? 
— I am from Bulgaria and Bulgaria is in Europe.  
 
The second category includes those children who declare they possess only a 
national identity. For the majority of them, the lack of European identification is not a 
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result of any explicit antagonism between the national and the European identities. In 
fact, for only four children in Bulgaria and four in England, the European and the 
national identities are mutually exclusive, because they clearly state they are not 
European as they cannot be both English/British and European, or both Bulgarian and 
European. Thus, when asked ‘Why did you say you are not European?’ a boy in 
Bulgaria replies ‘Because I am Bulgarian, actually Gypsy’, while a girl in England 
explains: ‘I don’t know. I asked my Mum “Am I European?” No, I am not European. I 
am either British or English or Hindu. That’s what my Mum says. I say what she says.’  
As the quotations demonstrate, these children perceive the European and 
national identities as mutually incompatible, which supports the argument about the 
influence of meanings and images of Europe. At the same time, these examples also 
provide support for the impact of ethnicity; many of the children who fail to define 
themselves as European are actually representatives of the ethnic minorities – mainly 
Indians in England and Roma in Bulgaria. Some of them endorse a national identity, but 
fail to embrace the European one perhaps because they do not consider it as inclusive. 
Our quantitative data also support this conclusion. Thus, only two Roma define 
themselves as European in contrast to more than a half of ethnic Bulgarians, χ2(2, 
N=107)=27.86, p<0.001. In England, 66.7 percent of the ethnic English define 
themselves as European in contrast to 28 percent of the minority, χ2(2, N=67)=14.39, 
p<0.001. These results, however, are very different from the ones reached by Cinnirella 
and Hamilton (2007), who concluded that the relationship between ethnic minority 
status and European identity among British Asians is positive. Given that our 
interviewees were children, while their study was based on a survey among adults, our 
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results might suggest that the youngest generation of British Asians share a different, 
more exclusive perception of Europe, but a more inclusive perception of their national 
(British and/or English) identity. Evidently, the relationship between ethnic minority 
status and European identity as well as the overall impact of social structures deserves a 
closer, more detailed consideration – something we intend to address in future work.    
Finally, the last category is the so-called ‘other’, namely all who do not fit into 
any of the previous three – they either say they have no national and European identities 
(23.4 percent in Bulgaria and 0 percent in England) or declare they feel only European 
(0 percent in Bulgaria and 3 percent in England). For these children, it is not relevant to 
research the relationship between the European and the national identity, because there 
is no such relationship – they define themselves as only British/English/Bulgarian or 
European or none for reasons other than interplay between the national and the 
European dimension.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, the results presented in this article help clarify the relationship between 
European identity and the various factors that, according to existing research, influence 
its formation – namely cognitive mobilization (specifically, knowledge about Europe/the 
EU), meanings of Europe, and the political and historical context. Our analysis 
demonstrates the key role played by divergent meanings of Europe, which helps explain 
the divergent patterns of knowledge and identification at both systemic and individual 
levels. Children who identify as European not only know more about Europe and/or the 
EU, but are more likely to see Europe in geographic terms, and this image facilitates the 
perception of the European identity as a taken-for-granted, default or even potentially 
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banal identity, one acquired simply by virtue of living in Europe. In contrast, children 
who refuse to describe themselves as European either know little about Europe and/or 
the EU, or perceive it primarily as an exclusive political entity, which is associated with 
high standards, distant political elites, or rich people – and therefore not an entity 
children can identify with.  
The latter group of meanings is significantly more common among Bulgarian 
children we interviewed, who also tend to see Europe as a distant ideal or a dream, and 
hence perceive the European identity as an ideal they aspire to but do not yet possess. 
Such idealized images are absent among English children. As a result, Bulgarian 
children are less likely to identify as European than English ones, although they tend to 
be more knowledgeable about Europe and in particular the EU. As we have argued, the 
systemic differences in meanings can be linked to the disparate political and historical 
trajectories of the two countries: on the one hand, the history of an idealized perception 
of (Western) Europe in Bulgaria, reactivated after the fall of communism; and on the 
other hand, the gradual proliferation of a default form of Europeanism in the UK. Still, 
the last point should not be overstated; although the percentage of English children who 
define themselves as European is higher than of Bulgarian, the difference is not that 
significant. Moreover, it is difficult to predict how this identification will develop with 
age, and especially with greater exposure to the notoriously Eurosceptic news coverage 
of European events in English media. The role of other socialization agents such as 
school and parents is also worth researching – a topic of analysis for subsequent papers. 
In terms of the relationship between national and European identities, there was 
no significant difference between European and Bulgarian children in our sample – for 
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slightly more than half in each group, the identities appeared complementary – and it 
was therefore impossible to draw any conclusions about the impact of systemic factors. 
In contrast, comparisons between individual children confirmed the influence of images 
of Europe. Those children who felt their national belonging was an obstacle to European 
identity tended to perceive Europe either as a threat or simply as incompatible with 
nationhood. The results also suggest that the relationship between European and national 
identity is affected by ethnicity, though not in the same way as suggested in existing 
research. In both countries, ethnic minority children were less likely to embrace a 
European identity, and their answers imply that European identity might have a racial 
boundary. These results call for a closer examination of the relationship between 
European identity and ethnicity – an issue that we could not tackle fully here, and which 
has to be addressed in conjunction with other social structures: age, gender, and, above 
all, class.  
1. The full questionnaire is available upon request. 
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Table 1. Most common patterns of relationship between knowledge and identification 
Pattern Bulgaria England Total 
% n % n % N 
1 29 31 53.7 36 38.5 67 
2 37.4 40 41.8 28 39.1 68 
3 6.5 7 1.5 1 4.6 8 
4 27.1 29 3 2 17.8 31 
 
Note: Pattern 1 is when a child knows about Europe and/or the EU and feels European, 
pattern 2 involves only knowledge without European identity, pattern 3: neither 
knowledge nor identity and pattern 4: identity without knowledge. Cross-national 
differences are statistically significant as χ2(1, N=174)=17.82, p<0.001. 
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Table 2. Patterns of relationship between the national and the European identities 
Country European and 
national  
Only national identity Other  
 
In total 
 
Nested 
 
In total 
 
Mutually 
exclusive 
 
Only 
European 
identity 
 
None 
% n % n % n % n % n % n 
Bulgaria 
(n=107) 
52.3 56 20.5 22 24.3 26 3.7 4 0 0 23.4 25
England 
(n=67) 
55.2 37 18 12 41.8 28 6 4 3 2 0 0 
 
 
